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Cross-Training with Imperfect Training Schemes
Abstract
Cross-training workers is one of the most efficient ways to achieve flexibility in
manufacturing and service systems to increase responsiveness to demand variability.
However, it is generally the case that cross-trained employees are not as productive as
employees who are originally trained on a specific task. Also, the productivity of the
cross-trained workers depend on when they are cross-trained. In this work, we consider
a two-stage model to analyze the affect of variations in productivity levels of workers on
cross-training policies. Our results indicate that the most important factor determining
the problem structure is the consistency in productivity levels of workers trained at
different times. As long as cross-training can be done in a consistent manner, the
productivity differences between cross-trained workers and workers originally trained
on the task plays a minor role. We also analyze the effect of the variabilities in demand
and producivity levels. We show that if the productivity levels of workers trained at
different times are consistent, the decision maker is inclined to defer the cross-training
decisions as the variability of demand or productivity levels increases. However, when
the productivities of workers trained at different times differ, the decision maker may
prefer to invest more in cross-training earlier as variability increases.
Keywords: cross-training, flexibility, newsvendor networks, productivity
1 Introduction
Designing flexible systems is one of the key strategies to increase responsiveness to variability
in the market without sacrificing efficiency of the system. One way to achieve flexibility in a
system is to cross-train workers on several processes. Cross-training has been proven to be
highly beneficial in many different business environments, including but not limited to the
semiconductor and automative industries, call centers and healthcare. For example, in the
semiconductor industry, machine operators are often cross-trained to run more than one type
of sophisticated equipment and technicians are often cross-trained to maintain more than
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one type of machine. In addition to increasing efficiency, cross-training can help keep the
budgets low, increase a company’s ability to pay more to the employees, to reduce turnover
rate, and increase quality due to the workers’ ability to react to unexpected changes (see
e.g., Lyons (1992), McCune (1994), Iravani et al. (2007)).
Cross-trained workers can be shifted to work on new tasks when needed, which yields
a more efficient usage of the resources. However, it is generally the case that cross-trained
employees do not perform equally well as employees who are originally trained on a specific
task, i.e., the training schemes may be imperfect. Moreover, the productivity levels of the
cross-trained workers may depend on when the cross-training is done. In this paper, our
main goal is to analyze how these differences in productivity levels affect cross-training
decisions. To analyze the effect of imperfect schemes and timing of cross-training decisions,
we consider a two-stage model and study the problem in a newsvendor network setting,
introduced by Van Mieghem (1998) and Van Mieghem and Rudi (2002). Our model is
similar to those of Van Mieghem (1998) and Bassamboo et al. (2010). Similar to the prior
work, the decision maker decides on the number of employees to cross-train, i.e., the level
of flexibility, before realizing the demand for the products. In the prior work, the first
stage decisions are structural (design) decisions where the level of flexibility is fixed and
does not change in the future. However, after demand reveals the decision maker may see
that additional cross-training is beneficial and may wish to increase the level of flexibility.
Hence, we extend the two stage model of Van Mieghem (1998) to allow the decision maker
to do online cross-training in the second stage. As argued above, the productivities of the
employees who are cross-trained before and after the demand is observed may differ. If the
demand exceeds the capacity even after the second stage cross-training, the excess demand
is lost and an opportunity cost is incurred.
Our main conclusion is that the main factor which determines the structure of the cross-
training problem is whether the workers can be cross-trained with the same productivity
consistently at different times. As long as the outcomes of the training schemes are consistent,
the imperfections play a minor role and the cross-training decisions with imperfect training
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exhibit similar properties to the case where training schemes are perfect, and the results for
perfect training schemes hold with minor modifications. We show that if the online training
schemes are as effective as the offline schemes, the cross-training policies are independent
of the opportunity cost. Similar to the abovementioned work, we provide newsvendor-type
equations to characterize the optimal cross-training levels under different scenarios and use
these equations to characterize situations when it is not profitable to invest in cross-training.
Then, we investigate how the variability of demand and productivity factors affect cross-
training policies. Under some mild conditions, we prove that the decision maker is inclined
to decrease first stage cross-training when the variance of random parameters increases and
the first and second stage training schemes are consistent.
If the first and second stage training schemes are not consistent in productivity, the op-
portunity cost plays an important role and the structure of the problem changes significantly,
i.e., the results for perfect training schemes are no longer applicable. Our findings indicate
that this structural difference is mainly due to the loss/gain of “achievable capacity” as a
consequence of training workers at different times. To investigate this further, we assume
that first stage cross-training is more effective on expected and test how the demand variabil-
ity affects cross-training decisions. We see that for small demand variances, the achievable
capacity may be enough to satisfy the demand with high probability even when all the
training is done in the second stage. Hence, the opportunity cost plays a minor role and the
first-stage cross-training decreases as demand variance increases. However, when demand
variance is over a certain threshold, the opportunity cost becomes an important issue and
should be avoided by increasing the achievable capacity. Hence, it may be beneficial to in-
crease first-stage cross-training levels as variance increases beyond this threshold. We also
study the behavior of cross-training policies as the variances of the first-stage productivity
factors change. We observe that there is a critical threshold for the variance such that the
first-stage productivity factor is less than the second stage productivity factor with a signifi-
cant probability. Increasing variance of the first-stage productivity factor below this critical
threshold leads to more first-stage cross-training. On the otherhand, increasing the variance
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above this critical threshold leads to a decrease in the optimal first-stage cross-training.
The opportunity to benefit from flexibility without too much investment has recently
accelerated research in designing efficient flexible systems and we see this work as a part of
this research effort. In their seminal paper, Jordan and Graves (1995) show that almost
all the benefits of a fully flexible system, where all resources can perform all tasks, can be
achieved by using a moderate level of flexibility. Their results demonstrate that using a
special flexibility configuration referred to as “chaining” and under certain assumptions on
demand, it is possible to obtain 98% of the throughput of a fully flexible system using re-
sources that can perform only two different tasks. Using tools from queueing theory, Jordan
et al. (2004) observe that cross-training can adversely affect performance if a poor control
policy is used and demonstrate that a complete chain is robust with respect to the control
policy and parameter uncertainty. In the literature, the ability of companies to achieve flexi-
bility and efficiency while at the same time meeting customer needs is sometimes also refered
as production agility (Gel et al. (2007); Hopp et al. (2004); Hopp and Van Oyen (2004)).
Hopp and Van Oyen (2004) develop a framework for workforce cross-training, provide a com-
prehensive review of the recent literature and suggest some future research directions. Hopp
et al. (2004) and Gel et al. (2007) analyze flexibility decisions for manufacturing systems
operating under CONWIP or WIP-constrained policies and conclude that a cross-trained
worker should perform her original task before helping on other tasks. Pinker and Shumsky
(2000) perform numerical studies to analyze the trade-off between efficiency and quality due
to cross-training. Netessine et al. (2002) show how the cross-training policies are affected by
the demand correlation. Davis et al. (2009) indicate that under high workload imbalances,
an extensive level of cross training is required to significantly improve the overall production
performance. In a service environment, Gnanlet and Wendell (2009) use two-stage stochastic
programming model to determine optimal resource levels and demonstrate the benefits of
cross-training activities in a health care setting. In their recent papers, Bassamboo et al.
(2009, 2010) define level-k resources to be the resources that are able to process k different
tasks. In Bassamboo et al. (2009), they prove that for symmetric queueing systems one only
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need to use dedicated resources and level-2 resources. Similar to our analysis, Bassamboo
et al. (2010) use the newsvendor network framework to prove that in the optimal flexibility
configurations only two adjacent levels of flexibility are needed. Chou et al. (2010) discuss
the effect of production efficiency comparing full flexibility with chaining structure. Another
paper which is closely related to our work is Chakravarthy and Agnihothri (2005), where
they study the optimum fraction of flexible servers for a two task problem with perfect train-
ing schemes. They point to the fact that cross-trained workers may not be as efficient as
dedicated workers. However, they do not provide an analysis of the problem.
There have been several attempts to formulate the problem as a mathematical program.
Brusco and Johns (1998) and Campbell (1999) provide integer programming models for
cross-training workers with different capability levels. Walsh et al. (2000) develop a two-
stage stochastic program for cross-training problem in semiconductor industry. Tanrisever
et al. (2012) propose a multi-stage stochastic integer programming model to design flexible
systems in make-to-order environments. In the literature, methods including Markov decision
processes, mathematical programming and heuristics, are used to schedule cross-trained
workers (see e.g., Vairaktarakis and Winch (1999), Sayın and Karabatı (2007) and Campbell
(2011)). Our primary focus is on aggregate planning of cross-training efforts and we do not
address the problem of scheduling the workers.
2 A Two-Stage Model for Cross-Training
In this section, our goal is to provide a detailed analysis of the cross-training problem for
two tasks when the cross-training schemes are imperfect. We provide a two-stage model to
answer how our cross-training policies are affected by the following factors:
i. the imperfectness in training schemes
ii. the differences in productivity levels of workers cross-trained at different times
iii. the variability in demand and productivity levels.
We also provide detailed numerical experiments in Section 3.
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We analyze the problem of cross-training workers between two tasks, α and γ. We assume
that the capacity is measured in time units and initially there is x0α and x
0
γ units of capacity
dedicated to process tasks α and γ, respectively. The decision maker has to develop an
aggregate workforce plan by cross-training some of the available workers before observing
the capacity requirements d˜α and d˜γ. Before actual demand is realized, it costs c
1
α to train one
unit of dedicated capacity of γ to work on task α. The cross-trained workers can still work
on their original task γ with full capacity. However, they are not as efficient in their new skill
α, and their capacity needs to be adjusted by a productivity factor δ˜1α, where 0 < δ˜
1
α ≤ 1; i.e.,
if a cross-trained γ-worker spends one hour working on task α, it is equivalant to δ˜1α hours
of an original α-worker. The productivity factor, δ˜1α, can also be perceived as an indicator of
the effectiveness of the training program and is assumed to be random. After the capacity
requirements for tasks are revealed, we first use the dedicated workers and workers cross-
trained in the first stage to satisfy the demand. If the available capacity for task α is not
enough to satisfy the requirement and there is excess capacity for task γ, additional cross-
training can be performed online at a unit cost of c2α. The productivity factor for the workers
cross-trained in the second stage is δ˜2α, where 0 < δ˜
2
α ≤ 1. If the workforce at hand cannot
satisfy the capacity requirements even after the second stage cross-training, the demand
is lost incurring a unit opportunity cost of hα. A similar mechanism works to satisfy the
demand for task γ interchanging the subscripts.
Without loss of generality, we assume that hα ≤ hγ. To simplify our analysis and nota-
tion, we also assume that random variables d˜α, d˜γ, δ˜
1 = (δ˜1α, δ˜
1
γ) and δ˜
2 = (δ˜2α, δ˜
2
γ) are continu-
ous random variables with joint density function f(d˜α, d˜γ, δ˜
1, δ˜2) and use ξ˜ = (d˜α, d˜γ, δ˜
1, δ˜2),
whenever we do not need to address specific random variables. Throughout this work, a
random variable x is denoted x˜, E[x˜] denotes the expected value of the random variable.
Similarly, we use E[x˜; Ω] =
∫
Ω
xdP (x) to denote the expectation over a scenario region Ω.
Now, we need to write out the objective function explicitly based on the mechanism
described above. The decision maker initially decides on x1α and x
1
γ, which are the amount of
workforce cross-trained from dedicated capacity of γ and α, respectively. We can decompose
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the cost function g(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) into the first stage cost which is incurred due to initial cross-
training and the second stage cost v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) which is revealed after the realization of
random parameters. Hence,
min
x1α,x
1
γ
E[g(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)] = min
x1α,x
1
γ
c1αx
1
α + c
1
γx
1
γ + E[v(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)]. (1)
The second stage cost, v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜), depends on whether new cross-training is needed after the
demand is observed. Hence, v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) takes different forms depending on the realization
of parameters. To analyze this function further and calculate the expected value for given
x1α, x
1
γ, we first use the tower property E[v(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)] = E[E[v(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)|δ˜2, δ˜1]]. To calculate
the conditional expectation E[v(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)|δ˜2, δ˜1], we first partition the support of (δ˜1, δ˜2) into
subsets, where in each subset the nature of the second stage decision is different. Then, we
partition the support of d˜α and d˜γ so that the function v(x
1
α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) has a single form within
a partition. This partitioning scheme is explained below and the most general graphical
representation is given in Figure 1.
We start partitioning the support of productivity factors (δ˜1, δ˜2) by considering whether
hα ≥ δ˜1γhγ or hα < δ˜1γhγ. This criterion determines the task to allocate a worker cross-trained
to work on task γ, when we need the worker for both tasks. If we allocate the worker for task
α, our gain will be hα. If instead, we allocate the worker to task γ, our gain will be δ˜
2
γhγ.
In the first case, where hα ≥ δ˜2γhγ, it is always more profitable to use the fully productive
capacity of task α to satisfy d˜α when needed. In the second case, where hα < δ˜
2
γhγ, even
if x0α is enough to satisfy the demand d˜α, it may be more profitable to shift some of this
capacity to task γ and lose task α demand.
2.1 Case 1: Workers Used in Their Original Tasks (hα ≥ δ˜1γhγ)
Under the condition hα ≥ δ˜1γhγ, task α demand will be lost only when the demand d˜α cannot
be supplied by using the initial capacity x0α and cross-trained workers who are not allocated
to task γ. Since hα ≤ hγ, the same claim is always true for task γ. Now we ask whether we
shall resort to second stage cross-training. The answer depends on the value of second stage
productivity factors and will be the next criterion for partitioning the support of δ˜2.
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Figure 1: Partitioning the support of the demand vector
If we choose to cross-train workers in the second stage, we need to spend c2α/δ˜
2
α to satisfy
unit demand of task α, or we lose the demand and incur a cost of hα. Hence, for task α, we
choose to resort to second stage cross-training first if c2α ≤ δ˜2αhα and we never cross-train in
the second stage if c2α > δ˜
2
αhα. Similar logic applies to task γ.
2.1.1 Case 1.a: c2α > δ˜
2
αhα and c
2
γ > δ˜
2
γhγ.
For this case, losing the demand is preferable over second-stage cross-training for both tasks.
Hence, there will be no second stage cross-training, and we can use the following partitioning
to explicitly state v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) for any given x
0
α, x
0
γ and ξ˜.
1. Ωa1 = {(d˜α, d˜γ) : d˜α ≤ x0α, d˜γ ≤ x0γ}. For the scenarios in Ω1, the initial workforce is
enough to satisfy the capacity requirements. Hence, v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = 0 on Ω
a
1.
2. Ωb1 = {(d˜α, d˜γ) : x0α < d˜α ≤ min{x0α + δ˜1αx1α, x0α + δ˜1α(x0γ − d˜γ)}, d˜γ ≤ x0γ}. On Ωb1, the
initial workforce x0α cannot satisfy d˜α. Task γ may need to use some workers who are
cross-trained to work on α, but the remaining cross-trained workforce is enough to
satisfy the excess demand for α. Hence, again v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = 0 on Ω
b
1.
3. Ωc1 is defined similar to Ω
b
1 with α and γ interchanged, and v(x
1
α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = 0 on Ω
c
1.
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We define Ω1 = Ω
a
1∪Ωb1∪Ωc1. When the demand falls in this region, no recourse action
is needed in the second stage and hence no cost is incurred.
4. Ω2 = {(d˜α, d˜γ) : x0α + δ˜1αx1α < d˜α, 0 ≤ d˜γ ≤ x0γ − x1α}(= Ωa2 ∪ Ωb2 in Figure 1). The
demand for γ is low so that all the cross-trained workers can be used to work on task
α. However, even this is not enough to satisfy d˜α and since second stage cross-training
is not profitable, demand is lost. Hence, v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = hα(d˜α − x0α − δ˜1αx1α) on Ω2.
5. Ω3 = {(d˜α, d˜γ), x0α + δ˜1α(x0γ − d˜γ) < d˜α, x0γ − x1α < d˜γ ≤ x0γ}. For scenarios in this subset
of the support, some but not all of the workers who are cross-trained to work on task
α can be shifted to α, and this is not enough to satisfy the capacity requirement. The
excess demand is lost and hence, v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = hα(d˜α − (x0α + δ˜1α(x0γ − d˜γ))) on Ω3.
6. Ω4 = {(d˜α, d˜γ), x0α−x1γ < d˜α ≤ x0α, x0γ + δ˜1γ(x0α− d˜α) < d˜γ}(= Ωa4∪Ωb4 in Figure 1). This
region is defined in the same way as Ω3 where α and γ are interchanged. The second
stage cost function is given by v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = hγ(d˜γ − (x0γ + δ˜1γ(x0α − d˜α))).
7. Ω5 = {(d˜α, d˜γ) : 0 ≤ d˜α ≤ x0α− x1γ, x0γ + δ˜1γx1γ}(= Ωa5 ∪Ωb5 in Figure 1). Ω5 is the analog
of Ω2 with α and γ interchanged. Hence, v(x
1
α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = hγ(d˜γ − x0γ − δ˜1γx1γ) on Ω5.
8. Ω6 = {(d˜α, d˜γ) : x0α < d˜α, x0γ < d˜γ}(= Ωa6 ∪ Ωb6 in Figure 1). Finally, in this case,
the initial capacity is not enough to satisfy the capacity requirement for either task.
Hence, excess demand is lost for both tasks. The second stage cost is
v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = hα(d˜α − x0α) + hγ(d˜γ − x0γ).
Now we are ready to state our first result.
Proposition 2.1. If P(hα ≥ δ˜1γhγ, c2α > δ˜2αhα, c2γ > δ˜2γhγ) = 1, then,
1. any x1α
∗ ∈ [0, x0γ], that satisfies the equation
E(δ˜1α;x0α + δ˜1αx1α
∗ ≤ dα, x0γ − x1α∗ > dγ) =
c1α
hα
, (2)
is an optimal cross-training level to work on task α.
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2. if E(δ˜1α;x0α + δ˜1αx1α ≤ dα, x0γ − x1α > dγ) ≥
c1α
hα
when x1α ∈ [0, x0γ] then x1α∗ = x0γ is the
optimal cross-training level to work on task α.
3. if E(δ˜1α;x0α + δ˜1αx1α
∗ ≤ dα, x0γ − x1α∗ > dγ) ≤
c1α
hα
on [0, x0γ] then x
1
α
∗
= 0 is the optimal
cross-training level to work on task α.
Same result holds for x1γ
∗
when α and γ are interchanged above.
Proof. We derive the first order optimality conditions by setting the derivatives equal to 0.
Then we need to check the second order derivatives to ensure convexity. First, we consider the
partial derivative with respect to the decision variable x1α. Since the bounds on productivity
factors δ˜1 and δ˜2 do not depend on the decision variables, using Leibniz rule
∂E[E[g(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)|δ˜1, δ˜2]]
∂x1α
= E
[
∂E[g(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)|δ˜1, δ˜2]
∂x1α
]
= c1α+E
[
6∑
i=1
∂E[v(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜); Ωi|δ˜1, δ˜2]
∂x1α
]
.
The second stage cost function v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) is constant with respect to x
1
α on Ω4,Ω5 and Ω6
and the bounds of these regions do not depend on x1α. Also on Ω1, the second stage cost is
uniformly equal to 0. Hence, the derivatives of expectation over these regions are all equal
to 0. To simplify the notation, we use f(d˜α, d˜γ) to denote the density function of demand
vector when productivity factors are given. The derivative of expectation over Ω2 is
∂E[v(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜); Ω2|δ˜1, δ˜2]
∂x1α
= −hαδ˜1α
∫ ∞
x0α+δ˜
1
αx
1
α
∫ x0γ−x1α
0
f(dα, dγ)ddγddα
−
∫ ∞
x0α+δ˜
1
αx
1
α
hα(dα − x0α − δ˜1αx1α)f(dα, x0γ − x1α)ddα
Similarly, we can calculate the derivative of expectation over Ω3
∂E[v(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜); Ω3|δ˜1, δ˜2]
∂x1α
=
∫ ∞
x0α+δ˜
1
αx
1
α
hα(dα − x0α − δ˜1αx1α)f(dα, x0γ − x1α)ddα
Canceling the boundary terms, we get
∂E[E[g(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)|δ˜1, δ˜2]]
∂x1α
= c1α − hαE[δ˜1α;x0α + δ˜1αx1α ≤ dα, x0γ − x1α > dγ]. (3)
The partial derivative with respect to x1γ can be found similarly. Setting these terms to
equal 0, we get equation (2). Now, we need to show that the (x1α, x
1
γ) pairs that solve these
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equations, actually minimizes the expected cost by showing that expected cost function
is convex in decision variables. Equation (3) suggests that the first partial derivative of
the expected cost function with respect to x1α only depends on x
1
α, hence we do not need
to consider the cross-partials and the hessian matrix is positive semidefinite if the second
partial derivatives with respect to x1α and x
1
γ are both nonnegative.
∂2E[E[g(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)|δ˜1, δ˜2]]
(∂x1α)
2
= −hα
∂E[δ˜1α
∫ ∞
x0α+δ˜
1
αx
1
α
∫ x0γ−x1α
0
f(dα, dγ)ddγddα]
∂x1α
.
Observe that if x1α < x¯
1
α, then
{(d˜α, d˜γ) : x0α+ δ˜1αx¯1α < d˜α, 0 ≤ d˜γ ≤ x0γ−x¯1α} ⊆ {(d˜α, d˜γ) : x0α+ δ˜1αx1α < d˜α, 0 ≤ d˜γ ≤ x0γ−x1α}.
Using this relation and the fact that the density function and the productivity factor δ˜1α is
always positive, we get
lim
∆→0
E[δ˜0α(
∫∞
x0α+δ˜
1
α(x
1
α+∆)
∫ x0γ−(x1α+∆)
0
f(dα, dγ)ddγddα −
∫∞
x0α+δ˜
1
αx
1
α
∫ x0γ−x1α
0
f(dα, dγ)ddγddα)]
∆
≤ 0.
Plugging this back into the second derivative and repeating the same procedure for x1γ, we
conclude that the hessian is positive semidefinite and the expected cost function is convex.
When the expectation satisfies the inequality for the second case, the derivative of the
cost function is negative for any value in [0, x0γ]. Hence, to minimize the cost, we need to set
x1∗α to the maximum possible value. The third case can be proven similarly.
Since the distribution is assumed to be continuous, the derivative in (3) is continuous
in x1α. If the expectation takes both negative and positive values over x
1
α ∈ [0, x0γ], then
intermediate value theorem ensures us that (2) will be satisfied for some x1∗α . Hence, the
three cases stated in the proposition covers all possible situations.
Proposition 2.1 assumes continuous distributions. However, the results can be extended
to discrete setting using a similar methodology to the newsvendor problem.
An important feature of Proposition 2.1 is that it suggests that the problem is separable,
i.e., the optimal cross-training levels for tasks α and γ can be decided separately. Hence, we
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only state corollaries relating to task α below and similar results hold for γ by interchanging
the subscripts. An immediate consequence of the proposition is as follows.
Corollary 2.1. If the assumption of Proposition 2.1 holds and the first-stage productivity
factor δ˜1α is deterministically equal to δ
1
α, then
1. any x1α
∗ ∈ [0, x0γ] that satisfies the newsvendor-type equation
P(x0α + δ1αx1α ≤ a˜α, x0γ − x1α > d˜γ) =
c1α
δ1αhα
(4)
solves the cross-training problem.
2. if P(x0α + δ1αx1α ≤ d˜α, x0γ−x1α > d˜γ) ≥
c1α
δ1αhα
, then x1∗α = x
0
γ is the optimal cross-training
level to work on task α.
3. if P(x0α + δ1αx1α ≤ d˜α, x0γ − x1α > d˜γ) ≤
c1α
δ1αhα
, then x1∗α = 0 is the optimal cross-training
level to work on task α.
Proposition 2.1 also helps us understand when it is not profitable to cross-train.
Corollary 2.2. It is not profitable to cross-train for task α, if the assumption of Proposi-
tion 2.1 holds and at least one of E[δ˜1α], P(x0α ≤ d˜α) or P(x0γ ≤ d˜γ) is less than
c1α
hα
.
Proof. Using the fact that δ˜1α ≥ 0 with probability one, we get
E[δ˜1α;x0α + δ˜1αx1α
∗ ≤ d˜α, x0γ − x1α∗ > d˜γ] ≤ E[δ˜1α] ≤
c1α
hα
.
Using the third part of Proposition 2.1 the result follows. To prove the second and third parts
of the corollary, we use the same methodology realizing δ˜1α ≤ 1 with probability one.
Intuitively, one should not resort to cross-training if the effectiveness of training programs
is not good enough. The first part of the corollary quantifies how “good enough” should be
understood. The second part says that before cross-training one should make sure that there
is a solid chance that extra capacity will be needed. Even when extra capacity is needed,
demand for the other task may make it impossible to utilize the cross-trained workers.
Under some mild conditions, we can use Proposition 2.1 to infer how the variance of the
demand for different tasks affect the cross-training decisions.
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Corollary 2.3. Suppose d˜1 and d˜2 are symmetric random variables around zero, i.e.,
P(d˜i > x) = P(d˜i < −x)
for all values of x and i = 1, 2. If δ˜1α is deterministically equal to δ
1
α, 2c
1
α ≥ δα1 hα, the
demands for different tasks, d˜α and d˜γ, are independent, continuous and can be written as
d˜α = md˜1 + µ1 and d˜γ = nd˜2 + µ2,
then the optimal cross-training level x1∗α is non-increasing in both m and n.
Proof. Using equation (4) and independence, we get
P
(
x0α + δ
1
αx
1
α
∗ − µ1
m
≤ d˜1
)
P
(
x0γ − x1α∗ − µ2
n
> d˜2
)
=
c1α
δα1 hα
≥ 1
2
.
Now, we can infer that the probabilities on the left-hand side of the inequality should be
greater than 0.5. Then, using the fact that d˜1 and d˜2 are symmetric random variables
x0α + δ
1
αx
1
α
∗ − µ1
m
≤ 0 and x
0
γ − x1α∗ − µ2
n
≥ 0. (5)
The left-hand side of equation (4) decreases as m increases. Hence, if statement 1 of Corol-
lary 2.1 is true, we need to decrease x1∗α to recover the equality. If statement 2 is true, we
may either wish to stay at x0γ or we may wish to decrease x
1
α. For the third statement, we
do not need to take any action. Hence, this proves that the optimal cross-training level is
non-increasing in m. Similar arguments show that x1∗α is non-increasing in n.
Corollary 2.3 essentially states that if demands for products are independent and follow a
symmetric distribution, e.g. normal or uniform distributon, and if the costs and productivity
factors satisfy the conditions above, the optimal cross-training level for task α is decreasing
with the variances of demands. Unfortunately, when δ˜1α is not deterministic, we can construct
counter-examples where the monotonicity result does not hold. When δ˜1α is random, the first
inequality of (5) may fail to hold for some realizations of δ˜1α and these may force us to
increase the cross-training level as the variance increases. In Section 3, we provide examples
to show that we can lose monotonicity, if 2c1α < δ˜
α
1 hα. The next corollary shows how the
cross-training policies are affected by the variances of first-stage productivity factors.
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Corollary 2.4. Suppose δ˜ is a symmetric random variable around zero with support Ωδ, and
δ˜1α = ∆ + nδ˜. If P(hα ≥ δ˜1γhγ, c1α > δ˜2αhα, c1γ > δ˜2γhγ) = 1, and d˜α and d˜γ are independent,
then the optimal cross-training level x1∗ is non-increasing in n.
Proof. Using independence, we can write (2) as(∫
Ωδ
∫ ∞
x0α+(∆+nδ)x
1∗
α
(∆ + nδ)fd˜α,δ˜(dα, δ)ddαdδ
)
P(x0γ − x1∗α < d˜γ) =
c1α
hα
. (6)
First, we note that both the first and second multiplier on the left-hand side are non-
increasing in x1∗α for any value of n. Taking the derivative of the first multiplier on the
left-hand side with respect to n, we get
d
(∫
Ωδ
∫∞
x0α+(∆+nδ)x
1∗
α
(∆ + nδ)fd˜α,δ˜(dα, δ)ddαdδ
)
dn
=
∫ ∞
0
∫
Ωδ∩{δ< dα−x
0
α−x1∗α ∆
x1∗n }
δfd˜α,δ˜(dα, δ)dδddα
−
∫
Ωδ
x1∗α δ(∆ + nδ)fd˜α,δ˜(x
0
α + (∆ + nδ)x
1∗
α , δ)dδ.
Using E[δ˜] = 0, we can infer that the first term is non-positive. Also, as all the integrands
in the second term are non-negative, we can conclude that the derivative is non-positive.
Thus, the first multiplier in (6) is non-increasing with respect to n and if it decreases as n
increases, we need to decrease x1∗ to restore the equality in (6).
We construct the proof based on the assumption that cross-training will not be beneficial
in the second stage. However, if the second-stage productivity is preferable, then we might
lose the monotonicity of the first-stage cross-training with respect to the variance of the
productivity factor. Examples of such cases are demonstrated in Section 3.
2.1.2 Case 1.b: c2α ≤ δ˜2αhα and c2γ ≤ δ˜2γhγ.
Now, we consider the situation where it is profitable to cross-train in the second stage. The
demand is lost only when the available workforce is not able to satisfy the demand even after
cross-training all the free workers. Hence, the cost function will differ only when there is a
trade-off between the second stage cross-training and losing demand, i.e., the cost function
does not change for Ω1,Ω3,Ω4 and Ω6 and we only need to consider Ω2 and Ω5 further.
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1. Ωa2 = {(d˜α, d˜γ) : x0α + δ˜1αx1α < d˜α ≤ x0α + δ˜1αx1α + δ˜2α(x0γ − x1α − d˜γ), d˜γ < x0γ − x1α}. If
(d˜α, d˜γ) ∈ Ωa2, both the initial workforce and the cross-trained workforce are used in
performing task α. If (d˜α−x0α− δ˜1αx1α)/δ˜2α units of the workforce are cross-trained from
task γ, the remaining demand can be satisfied. Hence, the second stage cross-training
cost is
v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = c
2
α
d˜α − x0α − δ˜1αx1α
δ˜2α
.
2. Ωb2 = {(d˜α, d˜γ) : x0α + δ˜1αx1α + δ˜2α(x0γ − x1α − d˜γ) < d˜α, d˜γ < x0γ − x1α}. For the scenarios
in Ωb2, it is not possible to satisfy the demand for α even after all the cross-trained
workforce work on task α. The decision maker cross-trains the idle workforce of γ and
then excess demand is lost. Hence, over Ωb2
v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = c
2
α(x
0
γ − x1α − d˜γ) + hα(d˜α − xα − δ˜1αx1α − δ˜2α(x0γ − x1α − d˜γ)).
The structure for Ωa5 and Ω
b
5 is similar and we are ready to state the allocations for this case.
Proposition 2.2. If P(hα ≥ δ˜1γhγ, c2α ≤ δ˜2αhα, c2γ ≤ δ˜2γhγ) = 1, and the training effectiveness
for programs before and after demand is realized are the same, i.e., δ˜1α = δ˜
2
α with probability
one, then optimal cross-training decisions do not depend on the opportunity cost hα and
1. any solution x1α
∗
that satisfies the newsvendor-type equation
P(d˜α ≥ x0α + δ˜1αx1α∗, d˜γ ≤ x0γ − x1α∗) =
c1α
c2α
(7)
is an optimal cross-training level to work on task α.
2. if P(d˜α ≥ x0α + δ˜1αx0γ, d˜γ = 0) ≥
c1α
c2α
, then x1∗α = x
0
γ is the optimal cross-training level to
work on task α.
3. if P(d˜α ≥ x0α, d˜γ = x0γ) ≤
c1α
c2α
, then x1∗α = 0 is the optimal cross-training level to work
on task α.
The same result holds for task γ with α and γ interchanged above.
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Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 2.1 we need to derive the first and second or-
der optimality conditions. On regions Ω1,Ω3,Ω4 and Ω6, the structure is the same as in
Proposition 2.1 and the problem is separable in cross-training levels x1α and x
1
γ.
The derivative of the second-stage cost function over Ωa2 can be calculated as:
∂E[v(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜); Ωa2|δ˜1, δ˜2]
∂x1α
= −
∫ x0γ−x1α
0
∫ x0α+δ˜1αx1α+δ˜2α(x0γ−x1α−d˜γ)
x0α+δ˜
1
αx
1
α
c2αδ˜
1
α
δ˜2α
f(d˜α, d˜γ)dd˜αdd˜γ
+
∫ x0γ−x1α
0
(δ˜1α − δ˜2α)c2α(x0γ − x1α − d˜γ)f(x0α + δ˜1αx1α + δ˜2α(x0γ − x1α − d˜γ), d˜γ)dd˜γ.
The derivative over Ωb2 is
∂E[v(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜); Ωb2|δ˜1, δ˜2]
∂x1α
= −
∫ x0γ−x1α
0
∫ ∞
x0α+δ˜
1
αx
1
α+δ˜
2
α(x
0
γ−x1α−d˜γ)
(c2α + hα(δ˜
1
α − δ˜2α))f(d˜α, d˜γ)dd˜αdd˜γ
−
∫ x0γ−x1α
0
(δ˜1α − δ˜2α)c2α(x0γ − x1α − d˜γ)f(x0α + δ˜1αx1α + δ˜2α(x0γ − x1α − d˜γ), d˜γ)dd˜γ
−
∫ ∞
x0α+δ˜
1
αx
1
α
hα(d˜α − (x0α + δ˜1αx1α))f(d˜α, x0γ − x1α)dd˜α.
Aggregating all the results and cancelling the appropriate terms we get
∂E[g(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)|δ˜1, δ˜2]
∂x1α
= c1γ −
∫ x0γ−x1γ
0
∫ x0α+δ˜1γx1γ+δ˜2γ(x0γ−x1γ−d˜γ)
x0α+δ˜
1
γx
1
γ
c2αδ˜
1
α
δ˜2α
f(d˜α, d˜γ)dd˜αdd˜γ
−
∫ x0γ−x1γ
0
∫ ∞
x0α+δ˜
1
γx
1
γ+δ˜
2
γ(x
0
γ−x1γ−d˜γ)
(c2α + hα(δ˜
1
γ − δ˜2γ))f(d˜α, d˜γ)dd˜αdd˜γ.
(8)
If the training effectiveness is the same before and after the demand is observed, i.e., δ˜1α = δ˜
2
α,
then the first order condition reduces to (7) and the convexity of the cost function is proven
similar to Proposition 2.1. Since expectation preserves convexity, expected cost is convex
and the solution which satisfies (7) solves the cross-training problem for two tasks.
Under scenarios corresponding to Case 1.b the opportunity cost is incurred after all the
workforce is assured to be working on a task, i.e., only for the demand which can not be
satisfied from the available effective capacity. By analyzing the right hand side of (8), we
see that if δ˜1α and δ˜
2
α are fixed, the marginal opportunity cost incurred by not cross-training
one unit of capacity in the first stage is given by
hα(δ˜
1
α − δ˜2α)P(x0α + δ˜1αx1α + δ˜2α(x0γ − x1α − d˜γ) < d˜α, d˜γ ≤ x0γ − x1α).
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The opportunity cost plays a role just because of the scenarios in Ωb2, i.e., for the scenarios
where the second stage cross-training is needed. To understand this further, suppose we
defer training one unit of workforce to the second stage. This means that this workforce
works with effective capacity of δ˜2α, instead of δ˜
1
α, i.e. we lose δ˜
1
α − δ˜2α units of capacity
by training this workforce in the second stage rather than the first stage. Hence, only the
opportunity cost for this lost capacity affects our decisions. If the training effectiveness in
both stages is the same, then essentially we do not lose any available effective capacity and
hence opportunity cost does not play any role in our decisions.
Another question is what happens when δ˜1α 6= δ˜2α. We see that equation (8) would
reduce the cross-training problem to solving a simple univariate nonlinear equation if we
were to show that the function is convex over the feasible region [0, x0γ]. Unfortunately, it
can be shown that the objective function is not convex with respect to the decision variables
in general and this non-convexity depends on the probability distribution of the demand
vector. However, we can state the following relationship between the total cost second stage
productivity factors, even when non-convexity is present.
Proposition 2.3. The total cost is a convex function of δ2α over the interval [c
2
α/hα, 1].
Proof. The cost related to the demand for task γ is a constant with respect to δ2α and for
ease of notation we denote it as C. Then, given a demand scenario d and first-stage decisions
x1, the second stage cost can be written as a function of δ˜2α as follows:
v(x1, d, δ1, δ2) = max
{
0, c2α
dα − x0α − δ1αx1α
δ2α
,
c2α(x
0
γ − x1α − dγ) + hα(dα − xα − δ1αx1α − δ2α(x0γ − x1α − dγ))
}
+ C
The second stage cost function is the maximum of convex functions of δ2α and hence it is also
convex. As expectation preserves convexity, the result follows.
The convexity properties of the cost with respect to random variables can be used to infer
how the variances of these variables affect the total cost. Proposition 2.3 essentially indicates
that as long as the mean of δ˜2α is kept constant and P(c2α ≤ δ˜2αhα) = 1, the total cost increases
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as the variance of δ˜2α increases. The condition P(c2α ≤ δ˜2αhα) = 1 is of crucial importance
for this interpretation. If there exists a δ∗ in the support of δ˜2α such that c
2
α > δ
∗hα, the
decision maker prefers incurring opportunity cost when δ˜2α = δ
∗. Hence, in a neighborhood
of δ∗ the total cost is constant with respect to δ2α. If 0 < P(c2α ≤ δ˜2αhα) < 1, the decision
maker decided whether to lose the demand or cross-training in the second stage, i.e., the
second-stage cost function is the minimum of two convex function which is not convex in
general. This nonconvexity can sometimes cause the cost to decrease as the variance of δ˜2α
increases. Examples for such cases are presented in Section 3.
In both Cases 1.a and 1.b, the decisions for tasks can be made separately. Hence, we can
use the results above, when it is profitable to cross-train in the second stage for one task and
hire without cross-training for the other task, once we make sure that hα ≥ δ˜1γhγ.
2.2 Case 2: Workers Used in Their New Tasks (hα ≤ δ˜1γhγ)
In this section, we analyze the cases where it is profitable to allocate cross-trained workers to
task γ even when there is need for task α. Due to a similar reasoning as above, the problem
is again separable into tasks. The allocation policy for the workers who are cross-trained to
work on task α does not differ from Case 1 under this new assumption. Hence, the optimal
cross-training level for task α, x1α can be decided by using the results above. However, the
situation for task γ gets more complicated and we have different conditions for x1∗γ . As in
Case 1, we base our analysis on whether second stage cross-training is profitable or not.
2.2.1 Case 2.a: c2α > δ˜
2
αhα and c
2
γ > δ˜
2
γhγ.
In this case, one should avoid cross-training in the second stage. The conditions are similar
to those of Case 1.a, and the second stage cost function v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) takes the same form as
in Case 1.a over Ω1,Ω2,Ω3 or Ω5. We need to partition regions Ω4 and Ω6 further in order
to express the second stage cost function in closed form.
1. Ωa4 ∪ Ωb6 = {(d˜α, d˜γ), x0α − x1γ < d˜α ≤ x0α, x0γ + δ˜1γ(x0α − d˜α) < d˜γ < x0γ + δ˜1γx1γ}. Some of
the workers cross-trained to work on γ are needed for both tasks over this region. As
it is more profitable to employ them on task γ, task α demand is lost for the shifted
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workforce. Hence, the second stage cost is given by
v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = hα
(
d˜α − x0α +
d˜γ − x0γ
δ˜1γ
)
.
2. Ωb4 ∪Ωb6 = {(d˜α, d˜γ), x0α−x1γ < d˜α, x0γ + δ˜1γx1γ < d˜γ}. For scenarios in this region, all the
workforce cross-trained to work on γ are needed for both tasks and will be employed on
task γ. However, even after the workforce is shifted there is excess demand for task γ.
Hence, opportunity cost is incurred for both α and γ. The second stage cost function
is the sum of these costs and can be calculated as
v(x1α, x
1
γ, ξ˜) = hα(d˜α − x0α + x1γ) + hγ(d˜γ − x0γ − δ˜1γx1γ).
Proposition 2.4. If P(hα < δ˜1γhγ, c2α > δ˜2α, c2γ > δ˜2γhγ) = 1, then
1. any x1∗γ ∈ [0, x0α] satisfying the equation
E[δ˜1γhγ;x0γ + δ˜1γx1γ < d˜γ]− hαP(x0α − x1γ < d˜α, x0γ + δ˜1γx1γ < d˜γ) = c1γ (9)
is an optimal cross-training level to work on task γ.
2. if E[δ˜1γhγ;x0γ + δ˜1γx1γ < d˜γ]−hαP(x0α−x1γ < d˜α, x0γ + δ˜1γx1γ < d˜γ) ≥ c1γ, when x1γ ∈ [0, x0α],
then x1∗γ = x
0
α is the optimal cross training level to work on task γ.
3. if E[δ˜1γhγ;x0γ + δ˜1γx1γ < d˜γ]−hαP(x0α−x1γ < d˜α, x0γ + δ˜1γx1γ < d˜γ) ≤ c1γ, when x1γ ∈ [0, x0α],
then x1∗γ = 0 is the optimal cross training level to work on task γ.
Cross-training level to work on task α, x1∗α is decided using Proposition 2.1.
Proof. We know from the proof of Proposition 2.1 that
∂E(v(x1α, xγ, ξ˜); Ω1|δ˜1, δ˜2)
∂x1γ
=
∂E(v(x1α, xγ, ξ˜); Ω2|δ˜1, δ˜2)
∂x1γ
=
∂E(v(x1α, xγ, ξ˜); Ω3|δ˜1, δ˜2)
∂x1γ
= 0
and
∂E(v(x1α, xγ, ξ˜); Ω5|δ˜1, δ˜2)
∂x1γ
= −δ˜1γhγ
∫ x0α−x1γ
0
∫ ∞
x0γ+δ˜
1
γx
1
γ
f(dα, dγ)ddγddα
−hγ
∫ ∞
x0γ+δ˜
1
γx
1
γ
(dγ − x0γ − δ˜1γx1γ)f(x0α − x1γ, dγ)ddγ.
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Using Leibniz rule successively as in previous proofs we get
∂E(v(x1α, xγ, ξ˜); Ω
a
4 ∪ Ωa6|δ˜1, δ˜2)
∂x1γ
= δ˜1γhα
∫
x0α−x1γ
(dα − x0α − x1γ)f(dα, x0γ + δ˜1γx1γ)ddα
and
∂E(v(x1α, xγ, ξ˜); Ω
b
4 ∪ Ωb6|δ˜1, δ˜2)
∂x1γ
= (hα − δ˜1γhγ)
∫ ∞
x0α−x1γ
∫ ∞
x0γ+δ˜
1
γx
1
γ
f(dα, dγ)ddγddα
+hγ
∫ ∞
x0γ+δ˜
1
γx
1
γ
(dγ − x0γ − δ˜1γx1γ)f(x0α − x1γ, dγ)ddγ
−δ˜1γhα
∫
x0α−x1γ
(dα − x0α − x1γ)f(dα, x0γ + δ˜1γx1γ)ddα.
Summing the components above, we obtain
∂E[g(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)]
∂x1γ
= c1γ − E[δ˜1γhγ;x0γ + δ˜1γx1γ < d˜γ] + hαP(x0α − x1γ < d˜α, x0γ + δ˜1γx1γ < d˜γ)
(10)
and equation (9) follows as the first order condition for optimality. Now we prove the
convexity of the second stage cost function. The cross-partial derivatives are zero and from
Proposition 2.1, the second partial with respect to x1α is positive, hence we only need to
check the second partial with respect to x1γ. Without loss of generality, assume ∆ > 0, then
∂2E[g(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)]
(∂x1γ)
2
= lim
∆→0
∂E[g(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)]
∂x1γ
∣∣∣∣∣
x1γ=s+∆
− ∂E[g(x
1
α, x
1
γ, ξ˜)]
∂x1γ
∣∣∣∣∣
x1γ=s
∆
(11)
Then we get,
E[δ˜1γhγ;x0γ+δ˜1γs+∆ < d˜γ]−E[δ˜1γhγ;x0γ+δ˜1γs < d˜γ] = Eδ˜[−
∫ x0γ+δ˜1γs+∆
x0γ+δ˜
1
γs
∫ ∞
0
δ˜1γhγf(dα, dγ)ddαddγ]
and
hα(P(x0γ − s−∆ < d˜α, x0γ + δ˜1γs+ ∆ < d˜γ)− P(x0γ − s < d˜α, x0γ + δ˜1γs < d˜γ))
≥ hα(P(x0γ − s−∆ < d˜α, x0γ + δ˜1γs+ ∆ < d˜γ)− P(x0γ − s−∆ < d˜α, x0γ + δ˜1γs < d˜γ))
= −hαP(x0γ − s−∆ < d˜α, x0γ + δ˜1γs < d˜γ ≤ x0γ + δ˜1γs+ ∆)
≥ Eδ˜[−
∫ x0γ+δ˜1γs+∆
x0γ+δ˜
1
γs
∫ ∞
0
hαf(dα, dγ)ddαddγ].
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Using equations (10) and (11) along with above calculations, we get
∂2E[g(x1α, x1γ, ξ˜)]
(∂x1γ)
2
≥ lim
∆→0
Eδ˜[
∫ x0γ+δ˜1γs+∆
x0γ+δ˜
1
γs
∫∞
0
(δ˜1γhγ − hα)f(dα, dγ)ddαddγ]
∆
≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows from the assumption δ˜1γhγ > hα.
When δ˜1 is known deterministically, the expectations in the proposition can be replaced
with probabilities, which leads to a newsvendor-network type equation.
Corollary 2.5. If δ˜1 = δ1 deterministically, and P(hα < δ1γhγ, c2α > δ˜2α, c2γ > δ˜2γhγ) = 1, then
1. any x1∗γ ∈ [0, x0α] satisfying the equation
δ1γhγP(x0γ + δ1γx1γ < d˜γ)− hαP(x0α − x1γ < d˜α, x0γ + δ1γx1γ < d˜γ) = c1γ (12)
is an optimal cross-training level to work on task γ.
2. if δ1γhγP(x0γ + δ1γx1γ < d˜γ)− hαP(x0α− x1γ < d˜α, x0γ + δ1γx1γ < d˜γ) ≥ c1γ, when x1γ ∈ [0, x0α],
then x1∗γ = x
0
α is the optimal cross training level to work on task γ.
3. if δ1γhγP(x0γ + δ1γx1γ < d˜γ)− hαP(x0α− x1γ < d˜α, x0γ + δ1γx1γ < d˜γ) ≤ c1γ, when x1γ ∈ [0, x0α],
then x1∗γ = 0 is the optimal cross training level to work on task γ.
Cross-training level to work on task α, x1∗α is decided using Proposition 2.1.
Equation (12) suggests a trade-off between first stage cross-training and opportunity costs
in the second stage. The first term on the left-hand side denotes the savings resulting from
training one unit more to work on task γ. On the other hand, this extra cross-training may
cause an opportunity cost for α, which is denoted by the second term on the left-hand side.
2.2.2 Case 2.b: c2α < δ˜
2
αhα and c
2
γ < δ˜
2
γhγ.
Now, we consider the situation where it is profitable to cross-train in the second stage and
it is more profitable to use the cross-trained workforce for task γ when needed. Hence, the
case under consideration is a combination of Cases 1.b and 2.a. On regions Ω1,Ω2 and Ω3,
the cross-trained workforce for γ is not needed and the second stage cost function resembles
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the form in Case 1.b. On regions Ωa5 and Ω
b
5, the demand for task α workforce is low, so that
there is also no competition between different tasks. Hence, the second stage cost function
also takes the form in Case 1.b on these regions. On Ωa4,Ω
b
4,Ω
a
6 and Ω
b
6, two tasks compete
for the cross-trained workforce and second stage cross-training is not possible. So the second
stage cost function is the same as in Case 2.a. Now, the first and second order optimality
conditions can be compiled from the above results to obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5. If P(hα < δ1γhγ, c2α < δ˜2α, c2γ < δ˜2γhγ) = 1, and the training effectivenesses
before and after demand is realized are the same, i.e., δ˜1 = δ˜2 with probability one, then
1. any x1∗γ ∈ [0, x0α] satisfying the equation
c2γP(d˜α ≤ x0α − x1∗γ , d˜γ ≥ x0γ + δ˜1γx1∗γ ) + E[hα − δ˜1γhγ;x0α − x1∗γ , x0γ + δ˜1γx1∗γ ] = c1γ (13)
is an optimal cross-training level to work on task γ.
2. if c2γP(d˜α ≤ x0α − x1γ, d˜γ ≥ x0γ + δ˜1γx1∗γ ) + E[hα − δ˜1γhγ;x0α − x1γ, x0γ + δ˜1γx1γ] ≥ c1γ, when
x1γ ∈ [0, x0α], then x1∗γ = x0α is the optimal cross training level to work on task γ.
3. if c2γP(d˜α ≤ x0α − x1γ, d˜γ ≥ x0γ + δ˜1γx1∗γ ) + E[hα − δ˜1γhγ;x0α − x1γ, x0γ + δ˜1γx1γ] ≤ c1γ, when
x1γ ∈ [0, x0α], then x1∗γ = 0 is the optimal cross training level to work on task γ.
The optimal cross-training level for task α, x1∗α , is determined using Proposition 2.2.
Remember, under the conditions of Case 1.b and Proposition 2.2, the opportunity cost is
a fixed cost and when there is excess demand for both tasks, the workers are always assigned
to their original tasks and excess demand is lost. However, under Case 2.b, when there is
excess demand for both tasks, one should exploit the opportunity of saving δ˜1γhγ − hα per
person by assigning cross-trained workforce to work on task γ. This opportunity is reflected
in the second term on the left-hand side of (13).
3 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we analyze how varying different parameters affects cross-training policies
numerically. We consider the base-case problem in Table 1 and then vary the parameters to
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(a) h=3500 (b) h=5000
Figure 2: The total cost versus δ2/δ1
see how the decisions change. The base-case is designed so that task α is the task that mainly
needs cross-trained workers and task γ only occasionally exceeds the available capacity.
Parameter Values for α Values for γ
x0 5400 5400
c1 2800 2800
c2 4000 4000
δ1 0.90 0.90
δ2 0.90 0.90
d˜ Uniform(55000, 65000) Uniform(20000, 60000)
Table 1: Data for Base-Case Scenario of Two-Task Problem
In our first experiment, we wish to see how the difference between productivities of first
and second stages affects our cross-training costs. To eliminate the effect of cost difference,
we set c2α = c
2
γ = 2800 and vary the ratio of the productivity factors, i.e., δ
2/δ1, for both
tasks α and γ. The results are shown in Figure 2. The horizontal axis on Figure 2 shows
δ2/δ1 and the vertical axis shows the ratio of cost over the cost with no cross-training. We
see that for small δ2, it is not profitable to cross-train in the second stage. After a critical
value of δ2/δ1, the second stage cross-training becomes profitable and we see an almost linear
decrease in the cost. The critical value decreases as the opportunity cost increases.
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(a) The support width is between 0 and 40000 (b) Zoom in when the support width is be-
tween 0 and 4000
Figure 3: Individual costs with respect to the variability of demand for α when δ˜2α = δ˜
2
γ = 0.9
Now we demonstrate how the variance of demand affects our cross-training policies.
Figure 3 shows how the variance of demand for task α affects our decisions when productivity
vectors are high, i.e., δ˜2α = δ˜
2
γ = 0.9 with probability one. The demand follows a uniform
distribution with the same mean as in Table 1 and the horizontal axis denotes the width for
the support of demand. The vertical axis shows the cost as a percentage of the optimal cost
under deterministic demand. The opportunity costs hα and hγ are taken to be 8000. The
costs exhibit similar behavior when experimented with other values of the opportunity costs.
Figure 3(a) shows that when the demand for α has a small variance, the individual
costs differ from the deterministic demand only by a small margin. However, after a critical
threshold, the first-stage cross-training cost decreases significantly. Finally, if the variance
is too high, then we do not wish to cross-train at all as the condition (b) of Proposition 2.2.
Figure 3(b) shows how our cross-training policies change before we reach this critical value.
For these small variances, we do not change the first stage cross-training as variance in-
creases, but we begin to observe instances where second-stage cross-training is not needed
and the number of instances where demand is lost increases as well. Hence, contrary to
large variance instances, the second stage cross-training cost decreases and opportunity cost
increases with the variance of demand for α. Figure 4 demonstrates that the total cost
increases monotonically with the variance of demand for α.
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Figure 4: Total cost with respect to the variability of demand for α when δ˜2α = δ˜
2
γ = 0.9
Corallary 2.3 proves that the first stage cross-training is non-increasing with the demand
variance under certain conditions. Hence, we perform experiments to test how restrictive
these conditions are. To satisfy the assumption of no second stage cross-training, we take
c2α = c
2
γ = 5000, δ
2
α = 0.9 and δ
2
γ = 0.6. In Figure 5, we demonstrate the results of these
experiments for hi ranging from 5000 to 8000. The assumption c
1
i ≥ δ˜1i hi does not hold
for both tasks for these opportunity costs. When hα = hγ = 5000, 6000 or 7000, the first
stage cross-training cost is non-increasing. However, when hα = hγ = 8000, we observe a
non-monotonic behavior in the first stage cross-training cost. This behavior can be explained
as follows: We see that an increase in the variance forces the decision maker to decrease the
first-stage cross-training level as there is more chance that cross-trained workers may not be
needed when demand is observed. However, when δ˜1i 6= δ˜2i with a positive probability, some
capacity is lost by not training in the first-stage. When the opportunity cost and the demand
variance is really high, the decision maker cannot effort to lose this capacity. Hence, it is
better to take the risk of unnecessary cross-training rather than facing a high opportunity
cost. Hence, we conclude that c1i ≥ δ˜2i hi is sufficient for monotonicity but not necessary.
Figure 6 shows how the variance of demand for γ affects the cross-training policies when
the second stage productivity is as high as the first stage productivity. The variability of γ
demand has an influence over cross-training policies only when variance is significant. Mod-
erate variances do not cause a change in our first stage cross-training policies. This variability
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(a) h = 5000 (b) h = 6000
(c) h = 7000 (d) h = 8000
Figure 5: Individual costs with respect to the variability of demand for α when δ˜2α = δ˜
2
γ = 0.6
(a) First and second stage cross-training costs (b) Opportunity cost
Figure 6: Individual costs with respect to the variability of demand for γ when δ˜2α = δ˜
2
γ = 0.9
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is mitigated by increasing the opportunity cost and the second stage cross-training decreases.
When the variance is significant, the first stage cross-training cost starts decreasing and as
a result second stage cross-training cost increases together with the opportunity cost.
Another important factor determining our cross-training policies is the variability of pro-
ductivity factors. We start by investigating the effect of the variability of the first stage
productivity factor. Similar to our experiments with demand variability, we assume uniform
distribution for the first stage productivity factors, fix E[δ˜1α] = E[δ˜1γ] = 0.75, and vary the
width of the support of these random variables. We assume a relatively high opportunity
cost of hα = hγ = 8000. Figure 7(a) demonstrates how the individual costs behave when the
second stage productivity factor is deterministically equal to the expected value of the first
stage productivity factor. We observe that the first stage cross-training decreases monoton-
ically and this decrease is mitigated by an increase in the second stage cross-training.
(a) δ˜2α = δ˜
2
γ = 0.75 (b) δ˜
2
α = δ˜
2
γ = 0.65
Figure 7: Costs with respect to the variability of the first stage productivity factor
However, when the second stage cross-training productivity factor is lower than the ex-
pected value of the first stage, the cross-training policies exhibit a different behavior. Fig-
ure 7(b) demonstrates our experiments when δ˜2α = δ˜
2
γ = 0.65 with probability one. We
observe that the first stage cross-training increases when the variance is small and decreases
for higher variances. The intuitive reasoning for this behavior is as follows: When the vari-
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(a) hα = hγ = 6000 (b) hα = hγ = 8000
Figure 8: Costs with respect to the variability of the second stage productivity factor
(a) hα = hγ = 6000 (b) hα = hγ = 8000
Figure 9: Total cost with respect to the variability of the second stage productivity factor
ance of the first-stage productivity factor is small, cross-training workers in the first stage
increases the total available capacity for every realization of the productivity factor and this
extra capacity can be used. However, when the variance is high, we can observe really low
productivity factors which may make it more beneficial to cross-train in the second stage.
When the productivity factors are observed really high, there may not be enough demand
to justify such a high capacity. Hence, if the variance increases above a certain threshold, it
is beneficial to decrease first-stage cross-training.
Next, we investigate how the variability of the second stage productivity factor affects
the cross-training policies for low (hα = hγ = 6000) and high (hα = hγ = 8000) opportunity
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costs. The first stage productivity factor is assumed to be deterministic and the expected
value of the second stage is taken to be equal to the first stage productivity. Figure 8(a)
indicates that the first stage cross-training is not affected for low variability when opportunity
cost is low. However, when there is a significant probability that the second stage cross-
training can be more effective than the first stage, the optimal first stage cross-training
decreases. The second stage cross-training also tends to decrease until we hit this critical
probability. When the opportunity cost is high, the first stage cross-training is not affected
and the small variability yields an increase in the second stage cross-training as demonstrated
in Figure 8(b). However, incurring opportunity cost becomes preferable for higher variability.
Proposition 2.3 indicates that when the second stage productivity factor for task i
(i = α, γ) lies in [c2i /hi, 1] the total cost is a non-decreasing function of the variance of δ˜
2
i . Fig-
ure 9(b) demonstrates this behavior when hα = hγ = 8000. However, when hα = hγ = 6000,
there is a positive probability that the second stage productivity can lie outside this interval.
Figure 9(a) indicates that the total cost can be decreasing when this is the case.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this work, we have studied the effect of imperfect training schemes on the cross-training
policies. We have considered a two-stage model, where the workers can be cross-trained
offline in the first stage, before the demand is realized, and online in the second stage as
the demand is revealed. The cross-trained workers are assumed to be less productive than
the workers who are originally trained to do a specific task and the productivity of the
cross-trained workers may depend on when they are cross-trained. Surprisingly, when the
first stage and second stage training schemes are equally effective, then the cross-training
decisions are independent of the hiring or opportunity costs. When the first and second stage
training policies differ in their effectiveness, the structure of the problem changes significantly.
First, the objective function is not convex anymore and hence the newsvendor-type equations
we propose provide necessary conditions for optimality but they are not sufficient.
We have also analyzed how the variability of demand and productivity factors affect our
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cross-training decisions. We have shown that under some mild conditions, we tend to cross-
train less in the first stage as the demand or productivity factors become more variable.
However, when these conditions do not hold, we show via counter-examples that we may
wish to increase first stage cross-training as variability increases. Another interesting point is
that all the counter-examples we found in this context assume that the training effectiveness
is different for first and second stages.
The insights provided in this paper can be used to devise effective solution methods to
address the case when there are more than three tasks. We have also developed a two-stage
stochastic integer program to aid decision makers to design cross-training policies in the
presence of multiple tasks. We do not present this model in this paper to keep the focus
on managerial insights. The integer programming model is available from the authors upon
request.
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